The spread of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in 2003 was largely driven by hospitalassociated transmission where health care workers experienced the largest burden of disease. In • attemptingto improve occupational health and .infection control procedures to prevent occupationally acquired infections in health care workers, it is important to examine the perceptions of those workers who are expected to adhere to specific policies. The authors conducted 15 focus groups of health care workers representing seven different job classifications in two Canadian provinces where SARS outbreaks occurred in 2003 using a theoretical framework which divided factors associated with self-protective behaviour at work into organizational, environmental,
and individual factors. Content analysis of these discussions revealed that workers placed more importance on organizational factors than environmental and individual factors. The results are similar to those of a recently completed literature review of this subject, and should be considered when developing new occupational health initiatives to protect health care workers from existing or emerging respiratory tract infections.
T he outbreaks of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), which spread through China, Southeast Asia, and Canada in 2003, were primarily driven by hospital-associated transmission (World Health Organization, 2003) . Infection control measures were reportedly instituted in affected hospitals which largely controlled the outbreaks (Chan-Yeung, Seto, & Sung, 2003; Varia et aI., 2003) . However, many health care workers became infected despite the application of these measures (Ofner, Lem, Sarwal, Vearncombe, & Simor, 2003) . The Canadian outbreak resulted in 438 cases, with 51% of those infected being health care workers. Three health care workers died from SARS-related causes (National Advisory Coml.
mittee on SARS and Public Health, 2003) .
Worker education and the proper use of personal protective equipment (PPE) have been the traditional focus of infection control practices and occupational health programs in hospitals. It is now clear, however, that other factors in the workplace, such as the safety climate, are probably more important in protecting the health of ~_ .. " , .. " . f:f~.W·h at.'-0.) es' This Mea n for' . ,~. . ,:.; ,' :,W' o r:kp.1 ace It pPIi cati 0 n?: . . Health care workers feel that organizational factors in the workplace such as institutional attitudes toward worker safety, intra-institutional communication, safety training policies and infection control policies have a great influence on their ability to protect themselves from respiratory pathogens while atwork. This is also the conclusion of a recent literature review. Therefore, new initiatives directed atprotecting health care workers from these hazards should include organizational factors as an area of high priority.
health care workers (Gershon et al., 2000) . Dejoy (1986) proposed a theoretical model for fostering self-protective behavior at work. The model describes three general areas which interact to influence the effectiveness of occupational health initiatives: • Organizational factors (e.g., communication, training, performance feedback, social approval, other safety climate dimensions).
• Environmental factors that block or promote this behavior (e.g., engineering controls, physical space, availability and accessibility of PPE).
• Individual factors (e.g., beliefs, attitudes, values) that facilitate self-protective behavior. These factors interact as shown in the Figure. The authors analyzed the existing infection control and occupational health literature in terms of this theoretical model. The results are published elsewhere Moore et al., 2005) .
After the SARS outbreaks were contained, a study was undertaken in three Canadian cities affected by SARS to identify which organizational, environmental, and individual factors health care workers felt to be the most important in protecting themselves from respiratory tract infections while at work. The discussions focused predominantly on the risks of acquiring SARS during the outbreak period, but were intended to also relate to other hospital-acquired infections.
METHODS
A series of 15 focus groups were conducted primarily in Toronto, Ontario and Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada, cities where SARS outbreaks occurred in 2003. An additional group of occupational health and infection control professionals met in Ottawa, Ontario, a city where no SARS case were found, but where health care workers were required to step up infection control procedures during the outbreak in Toronto.
Focus Group Classification
Focus groups included seven different classifications of health care workers: • Occupational health staff. • Infection control practitioners. • Physicians.
• Clinical nursing staff. • Allied health professionals (e.g., respiratory therapists, laboratory technicians, physiotherapists). • Support staff. • Hospital managers.
Focus Group Participants
Participants were recruited by letters written to hospitals, relevant professional associations, and unions explaining the study's objective and asking them to identify appropriate participants. At total of 105 individuals participated in the focus group discussions. The Table shows More than 85% were from health care facilities where SARS patients were admitted, and 44% of participants reported having had contact with a SARS client at least once. Participants were mostly women (78%), reflecting the predominantly female health care work force, especially in the nursing profession which formed the single largest occupational group (24% of participants). Clinical managers were the next most represented group (12%), followed by occupational health and infection control managers (11%). The average age of participants was 43.1 years. Focus groups ranged in size from two to 11 individuals, with most groups having between 8 and 10 participants.
Focus Group Discussion Questions
The focus group discussions occurred in November and December 2003, approximately 5 months af- • Beliefs in effectiveness of infection control guidelines (as modified bypast experiences)
• Impact of PPE on the job (e.g., time constraints, increased workload, discomfort)
• Exhaustion and fatigue • Peer environment (e.g., peer compliance, peer feedback)
• Attitudes of family members ter the outbreak ended in Toronto. Each discussion was approximately 90 minutes in length. Participants discussed three broad questions related to organizational, environmental, and individual factors and their importance in infection control and occupational health and safety in health care facilities. The discussion questions were piloted with a mixed group of health care workers, and modified prior to their use in the first formal sessions. Examples of each of the three factors were provided, along with the following questions:
• How do workplace organization and the hospital culture influence the implementation of sound infection control practices and occupational health and safety initiatives?
• How have environmental factors (examples provided) affected your ability to practice safe infection control and, in tum, did you feel comfortable that the environment in which you worked was safe?
• What individual factors have influenced you in practicing safe infection control and occupational health? Facilitators read one question at a time and allowed the group to exhaust its discussion of the subject before moving on to the next question. Facilitators did not interfere in the discussion except where clarification was required or if some members of the group were having difficulty entering the conversation. There was also an opportunity for participants to discuss additional issues at the end of the sessions if not addressed earlier.
Transcript Analysis and Variable Coding
All focus groups were recorded and transcribed. The transcripts were analyzed using qualitative methods. Three researchers coded the transcripts according to a list of variables known or suspected to contribute to the effectiveness of workplace health and safety and infection control programs derived from the literature review Moore et. aI., 2005) . All three researchers reviewed a single transcript initially and compared their results to standardize coding procedures for subsequent transcripts reviewed by only one researcher. Variables were tracked for the number of times each was discussed and quotations were compiled that best represented the discussions from each group. New variables were also identified and tracked.
Narrative summaries were written and compiled, following a discussion among the three researchers related to which codes arose most frequently and which of the new codes were identified by several groups. The results may not reflect the views of the majority of health care workers because the researchers did not try to precisely quantify the responses. However, the points discussed were the elements where most groups spent significant amounts of time. These comments reflect a range of opinions which sometimes conflicted. The Sidebar summarizes the key points from the focus group analysis.
ORGANIZATIONAL FACTORS

Lack ofConsistency with Safety Instructions and Frequently Changing Directives ,
This was an issue commented on by nearly every group and was a source of much anxiety for health care JUNE 2005, VOL. 53, NO.6 workers both in British Columbia and Ontario. A support worker from Toronto described it this way:
...there was so much information. The information changed on more than a daily basis, and even the managers, sometimes, I am sure they were confused. Which directives to take? Which ones not to take? And I don't think there was enough time for even the managers to relate all the information to the work-·ers. We were just being bombarded with new directives, on how to do certain things and things changed so quickly...when you are so busy trying to actually do work; you don't have enough time to go sit at the computer and read word by word on what's being directed to you.
A clinical manager from Toronto said this about the changing directives:
...there was always that uncertainty of perhaps, there is information which we don't have. And you're telling me this now but will that change tomorrow? ... And I certainly think that that affectedthe compliance of the staff with following protocols and their own comfort levels...
Enforcement by Regulatory Agencies
Related to this issue was how external organizations, such as the Ministry of Labour in Ontario and the Workers' Compensation Board in British Columbia, exerted their authority in health care institutions. There was some diversity of opinion about these issues because while many workers saw the measures imposed as being somewhat Draconian, others saw some measures, such as the requirement for fit-testing, as long overdue. In comparing the role of the Ministry of Labour in health care versus other industries, one occupational health and safety professional said this:
...the Ministry of Labour traditionally does not go into health care settings....Theygo into [other] industries and they say "Okay, where is your card for your fit-testing performance?" If you don't produce it, the employees can be fined. The employer can also be fined right up to senior management and that does happen. But traditionally, in the health care setting, they do not come in. So if they do start coming in, there might be a shift.
An infection control practitioner felt that the new levels of enforcement by the Ministry of Labour interfered with rational infection control practice:
We couldn't use those sound principles (i.e., existing infection control principles) because we're told that if it's a directive (i.e., an order from the Ministry of Labour), you have to apply it.
Workplace Attitudes Toward Safety
Generally, it was believed there was a lack of commitment to occupational health and safety in health care both by workers and by management. Management's commitment to worker safety is primarily judged by their actions. This was seen during the SARS crisis in terms of whether management was willing to spend money to buy extra PPE and whether they were willing after SARS to hire more infection control and occupational health professionals. It was also seen in their visibility during the crisis. A support staff worker from Toronto said: I think ... more involvement with the president of the hospital. I think that when that person is speaking to you and addressing the issue, you feel like you are in the loop. When you are getting all this second-hand information from everywhere, you wonder what they are hiding.
In the absence of an outbreak, health care often sends mixed messages to its employees. A nurse from Vancouver described this:
I know that at Hospital B there is a policy now that if you have flu-like symptoms, if you have the headache and sore throat, you're not to show up for work. But they're monitoring all the sick time that we're using. Some managers... is [sic] giving direction to use a LOA [leave of absence], instead of a sick day...It's talking out of both sides of the mouth.
The recent downsizing of the work force and the replacement, in most facilities, of the head nurse position, with a charge nurse who changes from day to day has made this more complicated. However one allied health professional said:
...I think what ended up happening with the SARS outbreak in our facility is that there would be infection control individuals, who would come in...the leU and speak with whichever bedside nurse was managing that particular client on that day. That individual, that nurse, then became the infection control officer for the rest of the shift and for every other individual.
However, most nurses did not see this as being a sustainable solution.
The occupational health and safety groups felt that their role was generally undervalued in health care. As described by a participant from a mixed group of health care workers in Toronto: "...I'm not even sure if people knew that we had an occupational hygienist, or what their role was in the institution."
Evidence-Based and Practicallmection Control Policies
Health care workers often felt that infection control policies developed elsewhere often had little relevance to their workplace, especially if the institution had not experienced SARS. Some of the participants came from institutions where they felt that effective infection control policies were in place, but where the resources necessary to make these policies happen were not available. Most groups mentioned that their institutions did not have an adequate number of infection control practitioners. Both infection control practitioners (ICPs) and non-ICPs saw the importance of ICPs being visible on the wards, but often differed 262 in how they viewed their current visibility. ICPs generally saw themselves spending most of their time on the wards, whereas other health staff felt they were not visible enough.
Other participants felt that basic infection control policies and procedures in their institutions were either not well developed or were not enforced. Identified deficiencies included tracking who receives training in infection control to ensure that all workers who need training actually attend, consistent policies for quarantining individuals, re-use of masks, and deciding which clients require negative pressure rooms.
Many participants described the need to establish a respiratory assessment for high-risk clients on which workers can rely and that does not lead to unnecessary precautions being taken. Participants did not agree about whether it was preferable to cohort nursing staff when caring for highly infectious clients. Some groups saw this as being beneficial, whereas others saw it as overburdening a small number of workers. Many groups mentioned the lack of infection control guidelines for clients and family members as being a source of frustration. One participant in the study said:
Sometimes you have the perception that the hospital is afraid to say no to visitors and that they do their best to accommodate visitors, but sometimes it's at the mercy of health care. It happened during SARS.
Infection control policies were also lacking for procedures for cleaning portable equipment in different care setting and establishing which procedures are classified as high risk, requiring extra protective measures .
Safety Training
Many groups felt that existing programs for training in infection control had been inadequate prior to SARS. However these problems were compounded when SARS struck and health care workers were expected to use new procedures and equipment without training or experience. In many facilities, health and safety training for SARS was delegated to front-line staff who had more experience in infection control, which led to other problems. An allied health professional from Vancouver said:
The problem is with primary instructor, it's also the primary caregiver, and so they have to determine what their priorities are going to be teaching all the staff as they're doing their bedside care, or are they going to be taking their focus away from their patient and worrying about all the staff.
The lack of flexibility or preparedness to rapidly educate staff during SARS was summarized by a manager from Toronto who said, "You cannot educate in a crisis."
With regard to planning for future training, workers suggested that better training records are needed. There was also recognition that classroom teacliing needs to be followed up on the wards to ensure that it is being properly applied. An Iep from Vancouver stated:
If you're teaching somebody something that they're not going to apply for a long time or isn't relevant to them at that particular moment, that's not going to be a useful thing to do... Also the question of where physicians, residents, and medical students fit into infection control training seemed unclear, as observed by a nurse from Vancouver:
There's all these little in-services from infection control and they are all gathering the nurses around the nurse's station to tell them how to do this and I never see the doctors gathering around and their residents, gathering round and getting an in-service.
Communication About Safety Within Health Care Organizations
The importance that health care workers placed on internal communication was best described by a manager from Toronto: I think communication is paramount to having any success in implementing any infection control procedures and I think that in some organizations that was a challenge, because how do you, you know, staff work three shifts, how do you disseminate all of this incredible amount of information simultaneously in a timely way, when we had new directives coming down the pipeline every hour sometimes.
Many of the communication issues centered around disseminating constantly changing directives. The best means of communicating these messages varied. A manager from Toronto described one method:
Wehad a "town hall" [meeting] betweenthe two sitesso that everyday there was communication of information. The staff really did want to see somebody, especially in the areas that were high risk areas-the emergency department,the areas wherethe SARS unit was.
The amalgamation of hospitals into larger administrative units was seen as a barrier to effective communication, as stated by a manager from Toronto:
...most of the decisions are being made at Hospital A and then they had to be disseminated down to the campuses, so what happened at my campus was that the information would sometimes come from the tnedia before coming to us. That was very difficult for staff and that led to a lot of talking in the corridors and people getting the wrong information. It's a big problem in a big institution.
It was generally recognized that relying on the media as an information source was not desirable.
Other communication strategies used during the SARS outbreaks included e-mail to staff. A support staff worker from Toronto:
It would have been nice to have been informed of the changes right ofLSometimes that didn't always happen...[Another speaker] And I can add to that. I personally think the reason that was, is because it was all done bye-mail and a lot of direct people-housekeeping, nursing, anybody that does direct care-do not sit down at a computer before they start their day. I think that it was not the ideal method.
Others felt that it was a useful addition to other forms of communication. Posters and notices were also widely used as reminders, environmental cues for infection control guidelines, and to inform the public about the situation on arrival in the hospital.
In addition to better communication from the organization to employees, other participants identified communication problems between employees in the hospital. This was described by a member of one of the mixed groups in Toronto who said:
Many times the patients arrive and we don't know that they've had a cough or a fever or something where we would have to take precautions, so I think there needs to be better communication between departments.
Effective communication between occupational health and infection control was generally seen as being beneficial both during a SARS outbreak and after. A support staff worker from Toronto stated: I don't think you can have a good health and safety program without having infection control included. And if they are not intermingled, then I think the system breaks down.
Fit-Testing
Fit-testing of respirators was not generally practiced in health care facilities in Canada until regulatory agencies began enforcement during the SARS outbreak. Participants did spend some time discussing fit-testing, but the value of it was not universally accepted. Inconsistencies in how fittesting was applied in different institutions were sources of concern. One of the managers from Toronto said:
We have a few issues around mask fitting. One of the things that were a concem...is it necessary? What's the benefit? Beyond that it's even the process and standardization of fit testing, because I think that depending on the company that you hired to do it, the process is not exactly the same...I think there needs to be some work around coordination and standardizing the fit testing process itself.
Other Organizational Factors
The increased worker fatigue, especially when using PPE in stressful situations, meant that productivity fell dramatically. Thus staffing levelson a per client basis needed to be increased to compensate and workers felt this was not adequately addressed. As well, because of the casualization and outsourcing of the labor force, participants felt that management needed to recognize that many employees work in more than one site, and are often not working full-time at anyone institution.
ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS
Physical Space and Engineering Issues
Participants spent the least amount of time talking about environmental factors. While participants rec-ognized the importance of physical space in infection control, there appeared to be great variation in available space. A member of the occupational health/infection control group in Ottawa stated:
I mean directives came out and said patents presenting to triage with infectious or respiratory symptoms had to be immediately isolated. Like it couldn't happen. There weren't (enough isolation rooms). I mean we have 10 rooms with closed doors on. It's impossible.
However, it seems that most of the facilities had adapted to the "new normal" of respiratory precaution hyper-vigilance. A nurse from Toronto describes the current situation as:
...whenever a patient has a temperature, right away the nurses put that patient under fever/pneumonia precautions, so we call infection control and place that room under isolation. If there is a patient in there, we take that patient out so we have to shift the whole floor around and put that patient in a private room.... That will continue and the only person who can take that person off the isolation is the infection control.
The same was true for anterooms. A participant from a mixed group in Toronto commented, "As far as an anteroom, we don't have those. They never existed." However, many facilities did have anterooms for workers to use, or were developing them. As Ontario hospitals were directed to provide negative pressure rooms for their clients during the SARS outbreak, most facilities had experience with creating them and using them. One manager from Toronto was convinced of their utility, as evidenced in the following statement:
Initially when this all started, patients who were being admitted were being admitted to negative pressure, ventilated rooms. There were a number of things that were done though to help create negative flow...1 think also too, when you look at the period of SARS III, what will make the difference, it definitely is, if we create negative pressure rooms in this area.
Another manager. recognized that establishing the negative pressure room was not enough: I feel that unless you do testing of the rooms once you've put in the unit, you don't have a clue what you have and that's the issue I've been fighting...You should even have continuous monitoring to see that negative pressure is maintained.
Environmental Decontamination
Generally participants felt that most of their facilities had adequate hand-cleansing gel stations, which could compensate for the areas where there might be a lack of hand-washing sinks. Others commented about the increased cleaning activities. A nurse from Toronto observed: I found that [during] SARS in our institution, it was the first time I worked there that they went around and they actually disinfected and cleaned the doorknobs, 264 the handrails, the pillars. I had never seen it before and they did it twice a day.
Availability ofSpecific PPE
Nearly all groups mentioned the supply problems with N95 masks during the SARS outbreaks. There were also supply problems with comfortable and effective faceshields and goggles. A physician from Toronto noted: I think one of the critical issues during this outbreak as well as any outbreak is not only the availability of N95 masks or higher, but are they availablefor the ones that you've been fit-tested with because right now there's a choice probably of about half a dozen that you might get tested for and find the one that fits you.
INDIVIDUAL FACTORS
Knowledge
Certainly, the knowledge of infection control procedures and the rationale behind them was important. A manager from Toronto said:
If we're going to expect that staff will want to work in a unit with patients infected with SARS or something similar, then we're going to haveto do a lot betterby providingcited evidenceto supportdecisionsthat are being made otherwise...the word of mouth is just not going to work.There needs to be somethingto back that up.
Another support staff worker from Toronto said:
If there was another outbreak of SARS in the hospital, they [other workers] would be gone. They would leave because... of all that uncertainty and fear. So I think an education for the employees would make a huge difference. If they knew what they were dealing with and if they knew what precautions to take.
However, it was also generally felt that knowledge alone was not sufficient for workers to protect themselves adequately.
Attitudes
Attitudes, such as professionalism, may compel health care workers to willingly expose themselves to risks at work, as explained by a support staff worker from Vancouver:
We work in this field and we know we are going to be exposed to this and we chose this field to work in, so you just have to safeguard and take all the precautions you can....It's different when you have inexperienced workers coming in.
A nurse from Toronto explained it as a mix of both professional ethics and personal empathy for her clients: I think, in general, the nurses think, oh yeah, I probably can [become infected], but I decided to be a nurse and I'm going to do it because what happens if.we all stop? ..What happens to me when that's me the patient?
Beliefs in Effectiveness ofInfection Control GUidelines
Generally, the heightened fear of SARS infection during the outbreak led health care workers to be vigilant for themselves and their coworkers. An allied health professional from Toronto noted that: .
During the outbreak, really compliance or non-compliance was a non-issue. Everybody just did and there was no question about it. I think the fear of contracting the disease was palpable, very real. Nobody was trying to cut corners.
In some circumstances this fear led some workers to refuse to work.
Past exposures to disease can also lead to decreased compliance when experience demonstrates that barriers are not needed 100% of the time. A support staff from Toronto said: . A support staff worker from Toronto found that the discomfort dramatically increased her workload: I remember going to clean a room and I'm a custodian so I do everythingfrom the ceiling, walls,floor...1 had to wear doubleof everythingexceptthe mask, but I had the shield. All I know is by the time I got out of the room, I could squeeze my clothes. I was so dehydrated. You can't just go back and get a drink. It's too time consuming... Becausejust coming out youhaveto strip and then you have to regown,doubleof everything and you have to go back in. And the time that it takes to put all these layerson is just so much that you can't be bothered.
Many participants felt that wearing the full protective equipment during SARS was quite uncomfortable, as described by a physician from Toronto who said:
Obviously, everybody found the respirators, in particular, cramped or irritating too. You sweat with them, so that's going to affect the compliance.
A nurse from Toronto said:
So sometimes in an evening you might wear three different masks because you're trying desperately to get something that is comfortable and doesn't smell like dill pickles and whatever else. They were awful. 
Exhaustion and Fatigue
Many participants mentioned fatigue as a major cause of failing to follow proper infection control guidelines. A nurse from Toronto described her experiences: I work 12 hour shifts in emergency, rarely got a break, so we were not permitted to have fluids at the desk. None. None in the care area. So we were going for five or six hours with nothing to drink. We were so exhausted. So at the end of your 12 hour shift by 6 and 7 hours you're so exhausted that you're crazy. That is now leading to sloppy practice.
Peer Environment
An allied health professional from Toronto stated:
If someone didn't comply, everybody else helped them comply. Cause we had one person that didn't want to comply and it was just like everybody was on the case of that person and they eventually did.
Peer feedback on compliance with PPEwas considered effective if it was applied. But it was often left to the nurses to "police" others coming in and out of the rooms, a role which they did not want. A nurse from Vancouver observed:
I never see the doctors and their residents gathering around and getting an in-service [on infection control]...And then, when you're the police at the bedside "Hey, wash your hands!" "All right..settle down." And you know what... it's the fifth time today that I'm telling somebody to wash their hands.
Altitudes ofFamily Members
The attitudes of family members can be an important determinant of increased compliance with infection control guidelines, as described by a support staff worker from Vancouver:
My son-in-law was angry [that I was working] but you just reassure them [sic] that you're taking a shower and you're taking all the precautions. And my boyfriend was the same way.You make sure that you wear that stuff and take all the safety precautions because he didn't want me getting sick. I think we were more at ease, but our family members were definitely upset.
DISCUSSION
Content analysis of the responses from these 15 focus groups of health care workers affected by SARS showed that front-line health care workers view organizational factors as being more important in determining the success of occupational health and infection control programs than factors in the physical environment or individual factors. This supports what has been found from a literature review conducted in parallel with this study Moore et al., 2005) . However, these factors do not exist in isolation from one another and, therefore, interventions directed at one of these areas will likely influence the others.
The individual beliefs and attitudes highlighted in these discussions are best addressed through changes in workplace culture, not through interventions directed at individuals. Furthermore, the availability of PPE does not ensure that health care workers will use it, largely because of the discomfort and time associated with its use. The fact that health care workers feel organizational, environmental, and individual factors are important indicates that policy-makers and researchers must address them to develop better policies and procedures to protect health care workers from infectious diseases at work.
The results ofthisstudyand theliterature review areused to directresearch funding priorities for the Change Foundation, a research funding agency supported by the Ontario Hospital 's Association (www.changefoundation.com) to better understand how theseobservations can be translated into improved occupational health and safety and infection control practices in Canadian hospitals. This study wasfunded by a grantfrom the Change Foundation.
